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C1nnNA. legislation necessarily operates on an abstract level, for
the statutorily-created offense is only a categorization of the great
variety of anti-social acts possessing certain specified characteristics.
Inherent in this distinction between the general and the particular,
the offense and the act, is the possibility that a single act will fit more
than one offense category. For example, if a defendant who has never
seen a medical school has committed an abortion, for what shall we bill
him-for abortion, for practicing medicine without a license, or both?
The mere existence of this act-offense dichotomy provides a resourceful
prosecutor with the potential for cumulation of punishment and avoid-
ance of constitutional guarantees against double jeopardy.
If the act-offense dichotomy threatened no more serious consequences
than the possible cumulation of consecutive terms of punishment, there
might be little cause for complaint. Indeed, such cumulation of punish-
ments provides a useful tool for court enlargement of sentencing power
beyond the somewhat mechanical frames laid down in the individual
penal statutes. Any injustice which might arise from manipulation of
a single fact situation to yield several convictions based on different
offense theories (whether brought simultaneously in the separate
counts of a single indictment or successively in separate indictments)
could then be remedied by either the sentencing judge or the pardon-
ing power: I the former being able to mitigate punishment by making
different prison terms run concurrently, the latter being in a position
to modify excessive punishment where consecutive terms have been
imposed. There is even a slim possibility that the Eighth Amendment,
which proscribes "cruel and unusual punishment," might be invoked.2
t State Department, Washington, D. C.
1. Badders v. United States, 240 U.S. 391 (1916); Samsone v. Zerbst, 73 F.2d 670
(10th Cir. 1934).
2. The notion of "cruel and unusual punishment" is an echo of 17th and 13th century
doctrine. See BOEmnR, OBSERVATO.NES SELECTE AD BEN.ED rr CruJmzovn Nov= i REunr
CsinrALium (1759) questio 132. In the United States, the Eighth Amendment has found
more favor with defense counsel than vith the courts. For an ex\tensive discuesion of the his-
tory of the Eighth Amendment, see Justice McKenna's opinion in Weems v. United States,
217 U.S. 349, 357 (1909) (dwells mainly on the amendment as a restraint upon the leila-
ture). The applicability of the Eighth Amendment to the question of the execution of pun-
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Unfortunately, however, neither form of scrutiny outlined above can
come into play until after the first trial has ended with a conviction.
If a new indictment is drawn after an acquittal, the old facts being
rearranged to fit a new offense theory, the defendant is forced to stand
trial once again.
Thus, not only may prosecutors use one act to fit several separate
counts of the same indictment; they may frame successive independ-
ent indictments from the variety of offense schemes applicable to the
particular facts. If the prosecution was either negligent, or cautious
enough not to play its entire hand in the initial prosecution, to what
extent is it to be permitted to use the act-offense dichotomy in order to
present an acquitted defendant with a brand new indictment? May
the same act be seized upon as often as ingenuity can produce a new
offense scheme? Or is there a certain point at which the prosecution's
right to try the defendant for the same act becomes exhausted? And
what of society's interest in avoiding the waste of repetitive litigation?
Such problems root deep, yet are regularly confronting our courts as
defendants seize them with their pleas of double jeopardy.
Some of these problems might be eliminated by establishing new
offense schemes which would fit each fact situation more closely. How-
ever, the more the legislator individualizes offenses, the more likely he
is to create potential new gaps which will be brought out by slight
variations in the fact situation; and the basic problem of simultaneous
or alternative application of the different offense categories would be
made even more complex.
A more practical solution might be to intrust the entire problem to
ishment is altogether denied in the majority and concurring opinions of State of Louisiana
ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U. S. 459, 464, 470 (1947). Theoretically the applicability
of the Eighth Amendment to the cumulative enforcement of a "great number of criminal
sanctions" has been asserted by Justice Frankfurter , concurring in United States ex rel.
Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 556 (1942). However, there the matter rests, although opin-
ions have repeatedly stressed the undesirability of cumulative sentences. See Harrison v.
United States, 7 F.2d 259, 263 (2d Cir. 1925); Beckett v. United States, 84 F.2d 731 (6th
Cir. 1936) (emphasizing, however, that such practice does not constitute error and indicat-
ing that relief lies with the pardoning power); Ginsberg v. United States, 96 F.2d 433, 437
(5th Cir. 1938). But see Amendola v. United States, 17 F.2d 529 (2d Cir. 1927) (a procedural
technicality is seized upon expressis verbis in order to reverse judgment which had swelled
a single offense into several by charging it in different ways). See also Note, 45 HARV. LRnv.
535 (1932). A stricter measure is sometimes adopted when excessive punishment is inflicted
on the authority of city ordinances, but the cases turn more on the validity of the ordinances
as a justified exercise of police power; the cruel and unusual punishment issue is more in the
nature of an auxiliary argument. Edward & Browne Coal Co. v. Sioux City, 213 Iowa 1027,
240 N.W. 711 (1932); Note, 138 A.L.R. 1218 (1942). The prohibition of "excessive and un-
usual punishment" has recently entered German jurisprudence via para. 2(4) of ACC proc.
lamation no. 3 of Oct. 20, 1945; as regards the so far inconclusive results ef., GE.LHAARj DIE
GRAusAmE UND UEBERMAESSIG HOHE STRAFE DEUTSCHLAND, 2 DIE SPRUCoaRICIHTE
338 (1948).
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the prosecution which shapes the indictments, the courts acting as
final arbiters of the offense schemes to be applied. But the inelastic
approach of the judiciary to double jeopardy pleas in the past indicates
that they may not prove to be reliable overseers. Courts have generally
ignored such pleas, relying on a stereotyped formula, the "same ei-
dence" test, which prescribes denial of the double jeopardy contention if
the second charge is so drawn as to be hypotheticallyprovable by differ-
ent evidentiary facts. As presently used, the test leads not only to un-
predictable results, but also is slowly eroding a procedural objective
which deserves to be upheld-the finality of criminal judgments.
Unavoidable though the act-offense dichotomy may be, we should not
permit its being manipulated so as to endanger this objective.
Despite the unsatisfactory interpretation now being given by the
courts to the concept of double jeopardy, that approach to the act-
offense problem has the distinct advantage of attempting to prevent
a second trial for the same criminal act, thereby eliminating the social
cost of successive prosecutions. It would seem, therefore, that double
jeopardy doctrine is in need of new content. To this task, both sub-
stantive law and procedure must make their contributions. 3 Sub-
stantive law is delegated the problem of disentangling the difficulties
of the coexistence of act and offense-the criminal result as it appears
in fact and the attempt of the criminal law to put such result in a
conceptual straitjacket. Procedure, on the other hand, has the as-
signment of providing devices which are sufficiently flexible to handle
a variety of circumstances ranging, on the one hand, from the applica-
tion of many offense categories to a single fact situation; and on the
other hand, to the application of one offense scheme to many fact
situations. Therefore, if only for pedagogical reasons, two questions
should be treated separately: first, we shall ask how many offense
categories of the criminal law should be applied or excluded from
application in a given situation; and second, we shall ask what pro-
cedural rules should apply whenever the act-offense dichotomy makes
its appearance.
SUBSTANTIVE ANALYSIS OF THE COMPETITION AmONG
OFF5NSE CATEGORIES
The legislatures or commissions which draft criminal codes are
rarely omniscient. Their work is transmitted from one generation to
3. Horack, Tie Multiple Consegmuewes of a Single CriutziaAcl, 21 MInn,. L. fv. SO5,
806 (1937). Note, 24 MN. L. REV. 522, 558 (1940). The concept of double jeopardy and
the manifold unsuccessful attempts to determine the concept of same offense by means of a
study comparing the old and the new indictments, or the several counts of one and the same
indictment, are characteristics of the steady flow of decisions in the field. See RrsTA==isr;;T,
DOUBLE JEOPARDY (Official Draft 1935), comment to § 5; Horack, Supra; Note, 24 MINN.
L. REv. 522,556 (1940).
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another in piecemeal fashion, always with the prospect that the next
generation will add handsomely to statutes-quite often without
bothering to weed out obsolete ones or to harmonize the old with the
new.4 But even when the bulk of criminal law is laid down in a care-
fully framed code, it is unlikely that an easy solution will be provided
for the problem of competing offense categories.6
When such problems have arisen, several paths of interpretation
have been followed by the courts in their attempt to find some in-
dication of legislative intent. In most Anglo-American jurisdictions,
the mere presence of several distinguishable statutory provisions gives
proof of a legislative intent to "place a condemnation upon each dis-
tinct, separate part of every transaction." I Such a view does not rest
on an articulated legislative intent but on the inference that when the
legislature formulated several provisions, each of which could be applied
to the same facts, it implicitly ordered that such provisions should be
applied cumulatively. But the opposite conclusion may easily be and has
been drawn from legislative failure to provide specifically for such contin-
gencies.7 Of course, there are some few instances where express pro-
vision has been made for separate punishment of individual phases of
a criminal undertaking-phases which, though logically separable,
seem always to appear in the same configuration.8 In the overwhelming
number of cases, however, no clear legislative intent exists. The task
of ascertaining whether one or several offense schemes should apply
then becomes a judicial one which the courts constantly perform
behind the veil of their procedural tests.
Unfortunately, courts have not always had a clear-cut classification
of offenses ready at hand to assist them in their task. Certain char-
acteristics seem to appear often enough to warrant a classification of
criminal statutes into four categories: alternativity, specialty, con-
sumption or subsidiarity, and cumulation or norm competition. Under
varying labels, these divisions have been refined, but the advantage of
a more detailed subdivision seems to be outweighed by the apparent
practicability of these categories. 9
"Alternativity" refers to the mutually exclusive quality of certain
4. See, e.g., State v. Calcutt, 219 N.C. 545, 556, 15 S.E.2d 9,18 (1941).
5. See note 140 infra.
6. Burton v. United States, 202 U.S. 344, 377 (1905); Morgan v. Devine, 237 U.S. 632
(1914); Bozza v. United States, 330 U.S. 160 (1947); Fleisher v. United States, 91 F.2d 404
(6th Cir. 1937); People v. Devlin, 143 Cal. 128, 76 Pac. 900 (1904).
7. See State v. Cooper 13 N.J.L. 361 (1833).
8. E.g., N.Y. PENAL CODE § 406, Miss. RiLv. STAT. (1939) § 4448; United States v.
Glidden, 78 F.2d 639 (6th Cir. 1935); People v. Snyder, 241 N.Y. 81, 148 N.E. 796 (1925)
aff'g 214 App. Div. 742, 209 N.Y.Supp. 898 (3d Dep't 1925); for further statutes, see RE-
STATEMENT, DOUBLE JEOPARDY (official Draft 1935) comment to sec. 22, IV(a).
9. For a detailed analysis see HONIG, STUDIEN ZUR JURISTISCeEN & NATU.RLICUEN
HANDLUNGSEINHEIT (1925).
[Vol. 58: 513
1949] THE ACT, THE OFFENSE AND DOUBLE JEOPARDY 517
offenses-the application of one logically excludes the application of
another to the same factual situation. A defendant has committed
either murder or manslaughter; 10 he may have secured control over
someone else's property by larceny or by receiving stolen goods,11 by
larceny or by false pretenses.' 2 Ascertainment of whether the defend-
ant has violated the one or the other proscription13 may hinge on little
more than a choice between two possible sets of legal constructions.
For example, a finding of premeditation rather than negligence is a
judicial evaluation of evidence, not an element of the evidence; 14
nevertheless, such a finding will rule out the possibility of manslaughter.
Murder and manslaughter are, therefore, mutually exclusive offenses-
their relationship is that of "alternativity." 13
While a cumulative application of various offense schemes is logically
ruled out in "alternativitv" cases, no such clear-cut "either-or" re-
lation exists in the other types of offense categories. Often, several
legal prescriptions are applicable to the same factual situation. In
such cases, medieval Italian doctrine supplied the principles of "spe-
cialty" and "consumption" as the basis for elimination of competition
among offense schemes.
The "specialty" principle is grounded in the maxim that if two norms
are one to the other as lex specialis is to lex generalis, only the former
applies." Thus, since a bank robbery fits the statutory definition of
bank robbery as well as robbery, it might be classified as both. How-
ever, the statute which is specifically directed against bank robbery
will be applied to the exclusion of the more general robbery statute. To
add a number of examples coming under this rule: assault appears to be
lex generalis if compared with an assault with intent to commit a fel-
ony.'7 There may, of course, be a further subdivision, and assault with
intent to commit a felony may in its turn take the form of k.. generalis
as compared with assault on a female with intent to commit rape.
The same rule would prevail in regard to the relation between larceny
10. 2 HALE, PLEAS OF TE CRowi 246 (1stAm.ed 1847).
11. See George v. State, 59 Neb. 163, 80 N.W. 486 (1899); People v. Bigley, 178 MLsc.
552,35 N.Y.S.2d 130 (Sup. Ct. 1942).
12. Queen v. King, 1 Q.B. 214, 219 (1897); People v. Weil, 243 Ill. 203,90 N.E. 731
(1909) (false pretenses and confidence game); Griffith v. Ohio, 93 Ohio St. 294 (1915) (for-
gery and false check and false pretenses).
13. Childers, Note 32 J. CRPx.L. & CRXPMOLOGY 555 (1942).
14. People v. Noblett, 244 N.Y. 355, 155 N.E. 670 (1927); People v. Stiller, 255 App.
Div. 480,7 N.Y.S.2d 865 (1st Dep't 1938) aff'd 280 N.Y. 519,19 N.E.2d 923 (1939).
15. Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390, 400 (1931) (dis. opinion); Bargeszer v.
State, 95 Fla. 406, 116 So. 12 (1928) (one person cannot be both a thief and a receiver of
stolen goods); McCuiston v. State, 158 S.V.2d 527 (Tex. Cr. App. 1942).
16. BARTOLUS, 3 ad.D. de accus. 48.2.14; S.,cx3Tus, 10 ad. C.de accus. 9.2.9.
17. Queen v. Elrington, 121 Eng. Rep. 870, 873 (1861) (assault and battery-assault and
battery accompanied by malicious cutting); 1 Bisnop, CamLZAL LAw, § 1058,3 (9th ed.
1923).
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
and robbery, 8 fornication and seduction, 9 being intoxicated on a
public highway and driving a vehicle on a public highway while in-
toxicated. 21 And the ill-assorted "necessarily included offense" cate-
gory of Anglo-American practice2 1 also contains quite a number of
cases covered by the rule lex specialis derogat legi generalis.
The third and last type of case where the concurrent application of
different norms should be excluded comes under the rule, lex consunens
derogat legi consumptae, which, slightly broadened, might be styled,
lex prirnaria derogat legi subsidiariae. There are many situations in
which criminal behaviour, although apparently an entity, may be
divided into different, independent parcels. Illustrative is the difference
between attempted and consummated crime. The attempt has in-
dependent existence because, so long as a crime is still in the prepara-
tory stage, there remains the possibility of withdrawal or failure.2" But
once the crime has been committed, the preparation merges into the
completely executed crime. 23 There has been scant acknowledgment
of this principle of "consumption" or "subsidiarity" in our criminal
practice. The relation between conspiracy and consummated crime,
between burglary and larceny, between larceny and receiving stolen
goods are instances in which its application has been denied. Conspir-
acy cases comprise the most important group. In logic, there is no
reason why conspiracy should not merge into the consummated crime
as under the old doctrine of merger. But, for some time, the conspiracy
category has been the prosecutor's most cherished device for multi-
plying counts and for facilitating proof by establishing a consensus
and thus adducing the knowledge of one partner as evidence against
all. 4 The validity of the principle of vicarious responsibility is thereby
accepted in criminal law. 25
18. State v. Mikesell, 70 Iowa 176, 30 N.W. 474 (1886).
19. Hewitt v. United States, 110 F.2d 1 (8th Cir. 1940). But see United States V.
Harris, 26 F.Supp. 788 (S.D. Cal. 1939).
20. Banks v. State, 150 Ga. 73, 102 S.E. 519 (1920). But see Note 86 A.L.R. 1273
(1933).
21. 2 HALE, op. cit. supra, note 10, at 245-6; 4 BL. Coi n. *315; for a recent criticism
see Rutledge J. concurring in District of Columbia v. Buckley, 128 F.2d 17,21 (D.C.Cir.
1942), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 658 (1942).
22. Statev. McLaughlin, 121 Kan. 693, 249 Pac. 612 (1926).
23. Rules like the one contained in art. 22, § 260 N. Y. PENAL CODE allowingforconvic.
ton for an attempt, though the consummated crime was proven in trial, are to be considered
as strictly procedural devices which cannot alter existing legal relationships between theso
norms. See People v. Tavormina, 257 N.Y. 84, 177 N.E. 317 (1931).
24. See Bannon and Mulkey v. United States 156 U.S. 464, 469 (1894) ("To require an
overt act to be proven against every member of the conspiracy or a distinct act connecting
him with the combination to be alleged, would not only. be an innovation upon established
principles, but would render most prosecutions for the offense nugatory."); Holman, Evidence
in Conspiracy Cases, 4 AusT. L.J. 247 (1930); as regards the disadvantage for the defendant
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None of the legalistic reasons advanced to prove the distinction
between conspiracy and consummated crime seem to withstand crit-
ical analysis. 21 More weight has to be given, however, to the conten-
tion that the two offenses belong to a different hierarchy of value. The
elevation of joint misdemeanor to the rank of felony by applying to
it the sometimes harsher conspiracy statute has thus been defended on
the assumption that the criminal combination may be of greater
danger to society than the enterprise itself.- Such an argument would
be much more persuasive if the doubling of counts for conspiracy and
consummated crime were confined in practice to serious group schemes
for cooperative law-breaking.21
Addition of burglary to larceny counts seems only slightly less in-
veterate than the tendency to cumulate counts for conspiracy and for
consummated crimes. The separate punishment of both, in the absence
of express statutory authority to this effect,2 is based on the theoretical
possibility that the burglar may change his mind after having broken
into the premises. He may, thus runs the argument, see his larcenous
intentions frustrated and decide to commit rape.' But the rape which
may be committed as a result of the unforeseen opportunity created
by the "breaking and entering" should be sharply differentiated from
the larceny which is the expected and planned outcome of the chain of
interconnected actions which comprise the offense of burglary.3' In
the first case, two entirely different crimes are involved; in the latter
case, the rule lex consunnes derogat legi consumpae should be applied
because the larceny is the consummation of the burglary.A2
The /ex consumens rule should also apply to the majority of those
see Weiss v. United States, 103 F.2d 759 (3d Cir. 1939); for some recent strictures to this
practice see Rutledge J. in Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 773 (1945); for a recent
restatement of the official doctrine, see United States v. Bayer, 331 U.S. 532, 542 (1946).
25. But see Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 648 (1945) (dissenting opinion);
Note 16 Ford. L. Rev. 275 (1947); Freeman v. United States, 146 F.2d 978 (6th Cir. 1945)
(conspiracy to sell narcotics and substantive offense held same offense).
26. United States v. Rabinowich, 238 U.S. 78 (1915) (rests on the possibility of non-
consummation of the contemplated crime), see also Rutledge v. United States, 16S F.2d 776
(8th Cir. 1948) (conspiracy to escape by obtaining blades for sawing bars and attempted
escape by sawing bars held different offenses).
27. Sneed v. United States, 298 Fed. 911 (5th Cir. 1924).
28. See Recommendations of the Conference of Senior Circuit Judges, in AnmuAL
REPORT OF THE- ATroRNY GEN EURL FoR 1925, 5, 6.
29. See note 8 supra.
30. Peoplev. Devlin, 143 Cal. 128, 76 Pac. 900 (1904).
31. People v. Pickens, 61 Cal. App. 405,214 Pac. 1027 (1923); Mann v. Commonwealth,
118 Ky. 67, 80 SA.. 438 (1904).
32. The principle is old: comp. Baldus D.9, 2 ad 1. Aquil., additio to 1. 32.2: quandoque
sunt plura crimina, quorum unum inest alteri vel ut antecedens et minus principale, ut in-
sultus ad percussionem et tunc confunditur insultus, sicut pars confunditur in toto, et non
retinet propriam naturam; quandoque crimina sunt distincta et tunc loquitur lex adversus.
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cases where the legislator has attempted to carve out a variety of
offenses from one and the same transaction. By varying the legal
description so as to embrace the totality of possible ways and stages of
performance, a host of semi-independent, yet "generically identical
offenses," has been created. 3 They do not come under the lex specialis
rule because this type of offense does not logically presuppose the si-
multaneous commission of the general offense; theoretically, they can be
committed independently :34 liquor may be sold illegally without pos-
sessing it," narcotics may be shipped without possessing or selling
them.30 Thus, whenever one criminal act seems to include a later
stage of execution of a particular criminal intent, the offense describing
the earlier stage should merge into the offense describing the more
complete state of the identical act.3 In the overwhelming majority
of these cases, therefore, the lex consumens or "consumption" rule
would seem to apply. 8
Under that phase of the "consumption" rule discussed above, prior
acts are merged in the final stages of the same criminal transactions.
Such an approach must be contrasted with the cases in which a crim-
inal act unites with, and merges in, a prior one. When a thief has
stolen cattle, can he be punished a second time for marking the cattle
with his brand? The question has been answered in the affirmative.8"
But it does not seem fair to punish the thief tvice: the first time he is
punished for the act of usurping a right; if afterwards he acts as if he
were the legitimate proprietor, he is apparently being punished for the
exercise of a function the illegitimate usurpation of which has already
been the basis for his prior punishment. Individual acts by which he
33. District of Columbia v. Buckley, 128 F.2d 17, 21 (D.C.Cir. 1942) (concurring opin.
ion) cert. denied 317 U.S. 658 (1942).
34. Gavieres v. United States, 220 U.S. 338 (1911); Ex parle Rhinelander, 11 F. Supp,
298 (W.D. Tex. 1935). For a criticism of the reliance on a "theoretical possibility of a totally
irrelevant fact situation," see Comment, 40 YALE L. J. 462,468 (1931).
35. Albrecht v. United States, 273 U.S. 1, 11 (1926).
.- 36. K-ing v. United States, 31 F.2d 17 (9th Cir. 1929), aff'd 280 U.S. 521 (1929).
37. Cain v. United States, 19 F.2d 472 (8th Cir. 1927); Michener v. United States,
157 F.2d 616 (8th Cir. 1946), rev'd 331 U.S. 789 (1946) (without opinion, three justices dis-
senting); Commonwealth v. Heston, 292 Pa. 501, 141 AtI. 287 (1928).
38. For a category of cases where the language of the statute allows for commission of
one offense without commission of the cognate offense, see La Page v. United States, 146
F.2d 536 (8th Cir. 1945) (knowingly cause a girl to be transported for the purpose of prostitu-
tion-36 STAT. 825 (1910), 18 U.S.C. § 398 (1946); and knowingly persuade or induce any
girl to go from one place to another for the purpose of prostitution-35 STAT. 825 (1910),
18 U.S.C. § 399 (1946)).
39. People v. Kerrick, 144 Cal. 46, 77 Pac. 711 (1904). For a recent discussion of the
problem to what extent prior and subsequent acts are merged in the principal offense, see
PETRZILKA, ZUM PROBLEM DER STRAFLOsEN NACHTAT, 59 SCHWEIZERISCHE ZEITSCuhRIT
FUER STRAFCEcHT 161 (1945); HASTTER, LEHRBUCH DES SCHWEIZERISCHENq STrtAFRECUTS,
ALLGEMEINER TEiL 377 (2d ed. 1946).
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asserts his domination would seem to belong to the category of related
consequences for which he should be punished separately only if such
action would also be prohibited to the legitimate proprietor." The
same argument would appear to apply to the much discussed relation-
ship between larceny and receiving stolen goods.4'
The principle of "consumption" or "subsidiarity" does not neces-
sarily follow from a mechanical comparison of two sets of offenses, as
does the "specialty" rule. It is not even necessary that the offense
categories under comparison be closely related to each other. In many
instances, the allegations seem to show scant connection and yet, the
40. Spearsv. People, 220 Ill. 72, 77 N.E. 112 (1906).
41. It follows from the purpose of criminal statutes directed against larceny that the
criminal attack against property inherent in larceny comes to its conclusion when the act
of taking away the goods, has been achieved. The purpose of statutes directed against the
receiving of stolen goods is "to provide for cases not included in the prescriptioa against
larceny and to punish those-when a larceny has been committed-who receive or conceal
fruits of that crime, and to include a thief within that class would subject him for punish-
ment twice for a same criminal transaction." Smith v. State, 59 Ohio St. 350, 52 N.E. 826
(1898); see also People v. Ensor, 319 INI. 483, 142 N.E. 175 (1923); People v. Jacobs, 73
Cal. App. 334, 238 Pac. 770 (1925); Bargesserv. State, 95 Fla. 404, 116 So. 12 (1928); People
v. Bigley, 178 Misc. 352, 554, 35 N.Y.S.2d 130, 133 (Sup. Ct. 1942) ("To say that one can
feloniously again receive from himself to himself what he has already feloniously acquired
by himself and taken unto himself is an absurdity. No legalistic formula nor legalistic rea-
soning can make possible that which is impossible."); People v. Vitolo, 271 App. Div. 940,
68 N.Y.S.2d 3 (1st Dep't 1947) (dissenting opinion); Note, 136 A.L.R. 1037 (1942). But see
State v. Webber, 112 Mont. 204, 116 P.2d 679 (1941); Application of Lyons, 272 App. Div.
120, 69 N.Y.S.2d 715 (4th Dep't 1947), aff'd, 297 N.Y. 617, 75 N.E.2d 630 (1947). Since
the receiver frequently took part in the preparatory stages of the larceny as an accezory
before the fact, the question arises whether this exclusionary rule also applies to such Eitua-
ions. The cases are in conflict. See 136 A.L.R. 10S7, 1095 (1942). If, as provided in nu-
merous statutes, the accessory before the fact is punished as principal, no additional convic-
ion for receiving stolen goods seems justified. In all other cases, however, the question
does not seem to depend so much on the physical presence of the acceszory at the moment
of the execution of the larcenous act as upon whether the accessory could e-pect to acquire
possession of the goods at some later time. If there was no proof that his tating pccsezion
of stolen goods at a later time was part of a scheme established prior to the execution of the
larceny, conviction for receiving stolen goods seems justified; otherwise the receiver should
be convicted as a principal. People v. Brien, 53 Hun 496, 6 N.Y.Supp. 198 (Ist Dep't 189);
Snider v. State, 119 Tex. Crim. Rep. 635, 44 SAM2d 997 (1931); People v. Vitolo, 271 App.
Div. 940, 68 N.Y.S.2d 3 (Ist Dep't 1947) (dissenting opinion). Bu sce People v. Rivello, 39
App. Div. 454, 57 N.Y.Supp. 420 (1st Dep't 1899); State v. Webber, 112 Mont. 284, 116
P.2d 679 (1941); State v. Sheeley, 63 Nev. 88, 162 P.2d 96 (1945). In its recent decision in
Paterno v. Lyons, 334 U.S. 314 (194S) aff'g 297 N.Y. 617, 75 N.E.2d 630 (1947), the Supreme
Court speaks of "the overlapping nature" of grand larceny and receiving. However, it is
no more prepared than the lower courts to go so far as to assert that grand larccny would be
necessarily included under a charge of receiving. The result, a refusal to vacate a sentence
on a plea of guilty to grand larceny in the second degree resting on an original indictment of
receiving, is entirely justified. Yet the decision has been reached by obfuscating the logical
relationship between larceny and receiving rather than by frankly abandoning the theory
that the defendant cannot be sentenced under any other legal theory than on the one under
which he was originally indicted.
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maxim lex primaria derogat legi subsidariae may be applied. For exam-
ple, if a human body is disinterred or a tombstone removed without
authorization, the acts may be considered violations of a statute di-
rected against the destruction of personal property or may be consid-
ered larceny. If, however, a statute is available for the punishment of
illegal disinterment or removal of tombstones, there should be no
doubt that the two types of statutes do not compete and that the in-
vocation of one eliminates the other. 42 The same non-competitive
relation would seem to prevail between larceny and a statute penalizing
the deflecting of electrical current.43
The unifying element in the cases where "consumption" or "sub-
sidiarity" may be called into play exists in the perpetrator's own mind
and in his ultimate goal. Whatever appears to him as the principal
object of his criminal endeavors becomes the main object of the law's
protection. All other stages or aspects of his action, be they antecedent,
simultaneous, or posterior, would assume independent significance
only if their perpetration would endanger a different social interest;
otherwise, they merge in the offense category protecting the interest
towards which the main attention of the perpetrator is directed.
Despite outward appearances, only one offense exists in those sit-
uations where the principles of "alternativety," "specialty," and "con-
sumption" or "subsidiarity" can be called into play. There is another
class of cases, however, in which different legal norms enter into real
competition for the punishment of the same act-only then does a
cumulation of punishment seem logically justifiable.
Such a system of true norm competition apparently stems from the
greater awareness of the act-offense dichotomy in mature bodies of
law.44 Illustrative is Mommsen's rationalization of Roman practice as
rooted in the attempt to distinguish between the ethical foundations of
offenses. 45 Only one indictment was permitted if the offenses were
based on the same ethical foundation; if different ethical foundations
were involved, then several indictments would lie. Take the relation-
ship between incest and adultery, or that between robbery and murder.
42. State v. Jackson, 218 N.C. 373, 377, 11 S.E.2d 149, 152 (1940); see People v.
Christy, 20 N.Y.Supp. 278 (Sup. Ct. 1892) (destruction of property vs. poisoning of animals).
But see State v. Magone, 33 Ore. 570,56 Pac. 648 (1899).
43. United States v. Carlos, 21 Philippine Reports 553, 612 (1911) (dissenting opinion).
But see People v. Menagas, 367 Il. 330, 11 N.E.2d 403 (1937).
44. His, GESCHICHTE DES DEUTSCIEN STRAFRECETS BIS ZUR KAROLINA 48 (1928).
In general, it may be said that the more primitive the law, the smaller the inclination to
start such inquiries and the greater the preparedness to make the actor separately responsi.
ble for every external result of his activity.
45. Moxm tsEx, RoEMIscHs STRAFREdCT 889 (1890); however the material front which
Mommsen drew his rationalization-D.47.1.2; D.48.2.12; C.9.2.9.1-is in itself not free
from contradiction; see also Hoepfner, 1 EINHEIT UND MEHRHEIT VON VERDRECIIEN 7
(1901).
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Interests are protected by the law for entirely distinguishable reasons.
The prohibition of incest rests on the idea that sex relations between
close blood relations should be avoided; prohibition of adultery, in-
troduced under Augustus, protects the institution of marriage. Sim-
ilarly, if a man lends money without a license and in doing so extorts
usurious rates of interest, he contravenes two different norms. The
public need for supervising money lending leads to its prohibition
unless the lender has a license, whereas the proscription against usury
serves to protect the individual borrower.4 1 In such instances, legisla-
tion is concerned with the enforcement of two entirely distinct sets of
rules. If these rules happen to coincide in an individual case, none of
them should have precedence.
Of course, it is not always clear whether legislation actually protects
different interests or whether a host of apparently independent offenses
has been created in an attempt to catch up with new modes of under-
mining the same interest. If a drunken driver happens to be caught
while driving without a license, should he be punishable under two
offense schemes?4 7 The answer seems to depend on the purpose of the
licensing law. Norm competition would exist if the license were granted
on payment of a fee without previous examination. The licensing law
would then have a purely fiscal character and therefore be unrelated
to and, in fact, compete with the life-protecting norm directed against
drunken driving. But if some sort of an examination is required before
the license is granted, the law may be considered to be of a mixed na-
ture, both fiscal and life-protecting. It is then open to discussion
whether the lex primaria derogat legi subsidiariae or the norm compe-
tition rule should be applied.-"
46. People v. Faden, 271 N.Y. 435, 3 N.E. 2d 584 (1936). The same relationship would
seem to exdst between performing an abortion and practicing medicine without a license.
People v. Johnson, 82 Cal. App. 411, 256 Pac. 273 (1927). But see People v. Weinstock, 55
N.Y.S. 2d 309 (1937); and, between making false income tax returns and perjury in regard
to the return, see Levin v. United States, 5 F.2d 598 (9th Cir. 1925), cert. denied, 261 U.S.
562 (1925).
47. People v. Aldrich, 191 N.Y.S. 899 (Cty. Ct. 1922). But see People v. Skarczewsi,
178 Misc. 160, 33 N.Y.S.2d 299 (Cty. Ct. 1941), aff'd, 287 N.Y. 826,41 N.E.2d 99 (1942);
Garner v. State, 31 Ala. App. 52, 11 So. 2d 872 (1943); Note, 172 A.L.R. 1053, 1062 (1948).
48. An interesting problem of norm competition has recently arisen in Germany con-
cerning the relation of allied Control Council Law No. 10 (crimes against humanity) and the
existing German provisions for murder, assault, etc. The question is of considerable impor-
tance as the A.C.C. law provides for milder punishment than the German law for murder.
Judgments of the German courts show considerable variations. As the laws in question do
not derive from the same legislature, the provisions may not be easy to harmonize with one
another. However, both German and A.C.C. legislation have the goal of protecting life, and
therefore the German code, to the extent to which it contains more specific provisions,
would seem to have priority as ex specialis. On the whole problem see: Lange, KO.TROLL-
RATSGESETZ No. 10 UND DAs DEuTscaE RECHT, 3 DEUTSCH RECHTzEITrrscnRFT, 185, 190
(Deutschland 1948).
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Although the solution of such borderline cases may sometimes remain
in doubt, their very existence brings into sharper focus the main cri-
terion for determining the presence of true norm competition-the
discovery of separable social interests sought to be protected by the
different provisions of the law.
Within the field of norm competition, one special situation should
be mentioned. If one and the same act adversely affects the interests
of different people, the principles governing norm competition should
apply. In disposing of mortgaged property to the detriment of the
mortgagee, the statutory offense against the mortgagee competes with
the fraud against the buyer.49 Though both interests affected are prop-
erty interests, they pertain to two completely unrelated persons and
derive from two quite distinct situations. -As a result, there exists the
possibility of the cumulative punishment inherent in the rule of norm
competition.
Plurality of offense and the "act" concept
Hitherto we have dealt exclusively with cases where the actor's be-
havior presented itself in fact, though not in law, as a single act. It was
the artificial device of the law to dismember this natural unity and
parcel it out among any legal descriptions which seemed to fit it wholly
or in part. But plurality is not always the creation of the law. If a
person fires one shot killing three persons, it is not the legal definition
but the interpretation of the concept "act" which determines the
number of offenses to be attributed to the actor. But this "act" concept
is elusive and full of intrinsic difficulties. Is it to be delineated by the
muscular movement, the accompanying intent, or the outcome?
Austin had difficulty in separating the consequences from the muscular
movement and the corresponding will. 0
It seems preferable to ignore his lead and instead to emphasize the
equal share of intent, physical movement and consequences."5 As
Schopenhauer said: "Will and action are different only in the abstract.
In reality they are one and the same. Every genuine, spontaneous act
of the will becomes immediately apparent as an act of the body." 52
Sometimes, of course, the law itself commands disregard of conse-
quences and elevates the physical movement itself, regardless of the
consequences, to the rank of cdnsummated crime. 3 But usually, the
49. McClure v. State, 174 Tenn. 140,124 S.W.2d 240 (1939).
50. AUSTIN, PROVINCE OFJuRISPRUDENCE 165,427 (4th ed. 1873).
51. Hitchler, The Physical Element of Crime, 39 DicK.L.R. 95, 100 (1934); Husserl,
Negatives Sollen im Burgerlichen Recht, in FESTSCHRIFT FUER PAPPENIIEIm 87, 95 (1931).
52. SCROPENHAUER, WELT ALs WmLE UND VORSTELLUNG 120 (4th ed. 1873).
53. Hitchler, op. cit. supra note 51, at 106, 117.
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legislator is silent and attempts at interpretation from the mere word-
ing of the statute prove unsuccessful.54
The American Law Institute's commentary on double jeopardy
demonstrates that no generally accepted rationale exists for determin-
ing when several physical movements with but one success, or one
physical movement with several successes or a succes9ive chain of
similar acts, should be treated as one or several offenses; - Nor has the
steady flow of decisions led to a crystallization in one or theother direc-
tion. The granting or refusing of a new trial, the reversal or the affirm-
ance of a conviction on plural counts, has been arrived at through a
highly superficial course of rationalization. Courts have relied on single
act, single intent, single or multiple consequence theories, not as meth-
ods of analytical inquiry, but almost exclusively in order to justify
desired results.56 However, as the various rationalizations have before
been systematized, it would seem desirable to move at once to the
procedural level.
PROCEDURE AND THE ACT-OFFENSE DICHOTOMY
Under existing procedure, a skillful prosecutor finds it easy to manip-
ulate offense categories in such a way as to sidestep constitutional
guaranties against double jeopardy. By framing indictments without
being compelled to elect the particular statutory theory on which the
charges are based,57 he can provide for all possible contingencies. He
may multiply the number of counts drawn from the one criminal act
by splitting the single transaction into a string of offenses, each of
which might be placed in a separate count; or by using the single act
to build separate counts charging commission of different crimes, each
count being based upon a slight variation of the fact pattern. 3
Possibly, even more important is the power of the prosecutor to re-
fuse to confront the defendant, in the one trial, with all the possible
egal consequences of his anti-social behavior. He may choose from the
54. Ebeling v. Morgan, 237 U.S. 625 (1915); McKee v. Johnston, 109 F.2d 273 (9th
Cir. 1936); People v. Herbert, 51 P.2d 456, 462 (1935) (dissenting opinion); bul see Johnston
v. Lagomarsino, 88 F.2d 86 (9th Cir. 1937).
55. RESTATEmENT, op. d. supra, note 3 at 42.
56. See Horack, op. cit. supra, note 3.
57. REv. STAT. § 1024 (1875), 18 U.S.C. § 557 (1940), codified in FEn. R. C=s. P.,
8, 13, 14; FED. R. C=. P. 9a; see also Second Preliminary Draft, FED. R. Cnn. P. 32
(1944). As regards state provisions for joinder of offenses see RESTATEmENT, CODE or
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 185 (1931), Commentaries at 588. For the British practice see
KENNY, OuTumns o Cnn ALu, Aw 552 (15th ed. 1936).
58. Rex v. Hughes, 20 Crim. App. R. 46 (1927) (if counts were alternative, conviction
on all counts "absurd"); Rex v. Lincoln, (1944) 1 All Eng. L. R. 604 (decision on alternative
counts to be left to jury). The court may, according to present practice, instruct the jury
to convrict on all or several counts except, of course, in cases falling within the categories of
alternativity or specialty.
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total fact picture only enough details to fit the offense scheme he wishes
to present to the court. And in reserve, ready to be used to beset the
defendant in a double jeopardy contest, are the remaining untapped
details.
A verdict for the defendant may prompt the prosecution to bring a
new trial, proffering a new theory based upon the reserve details men-
tioned above. To this, the defendant will almost invariably reply with
a plea of double jeopardy. In like fashion, double jeopardy will be
invoked by the defendant who has been convicted, in one trial, on
several counts based upon a single criminal act."9 Courts tend to treat
both these situations in the same way. However, despite the fact that
the basic issue of double jeopardy is identical in either case, the impact
of the first situation seems to be more considerable than that of the
second. Suffering a complete new trial for substantially the same set
of facts would seem to involve a larger question of principle 0 than the
possibility of the defendant's serving an aggravated sentence because
the court failed to consider the logical relationship of the various of-
fenses and erroneously made the counts run consecutively. For exam-
ple, take the case in which the defendant has been acquitted of the man-
slaughter of A, who was killed by the car the defendant was driving.
If a new indictment is brought against the defendant for the killing of
B who was also a fatality in the same accident, the defendant has to go
through the anguish and expense of a completely new trial; a new jury
will pass on a set of facts identical with the one adjudicated in the
first trial with the exception of a change in the description of the victim.
Should he then be convicted at the second trial, there will be little
possibility that executive action can be invoked to nullify such con-
viction. In contrast, conviction on different counts gives the court
59. For cases where consecutive sentences on plural counts are attacked by a double
jeopardy plea compare Robinson v. United States, 143 F.2d276 (10th Cir. 1944) (one count
conspiracy, three counts transporting three different girls in the same car for prostitution
purposes-rev'd: "the same evidence test must be applied with some discrimination"; court
applies the category of act rather than the category of offense to which lip service is rendered)
with United States v. St. Clair, 62 F.Supp. 795 (W.D. Va. 1945) (identical fact situation
decided on the basis of traditional distinct offense label and same evidence test). Under "one
injury to the state theory," consecutive terms on plural counts of involuntary manslaughter
and aggravated assault and also for manslaughter of two occupants of a car have been held
improper: Commonwealth v. McCord, 116 Pa. Super. 480, 176 Atl. 834 (1935); Common-
wealth v. Carroll, 131 Pa. Super. 357, 200 Atl. 139 (1938). There is a potential injury to the
defendant even in concurrent sentences on different counts insofar as they may later serve
as record of a previous offense with the meaning of second or third offender provisions.
60. People v. Allen, 368 Ill. 368, 14 N.E.2d 397 (1938), appeal dismissed for want of
jurisdiction, 308 U.S. 511 (1939). But see Shaw's dissent, id. at 389, 407, "it must be borne
in mind that under the rule announced a citizen may be tried an indefinite number of times
for the same criminal act until a jury is finally found which will render a verdict suitable
to the prosecution"; see also People v. Brooklyn & Queens Transit Corp., 283 N.Y. 484,496,
28 N.E.2d925, 930 (1940); Note, Crn-KENT REV. 386, 388 (1939).
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wide leeway to adjust the punishment to the crime; it seems fair to say,
therefore, that the courts are treating on the same level two not en-
tirely commensurable problems.
Same evidence test
In both the foregoing typical situations, there is little likelihood that
the defendant will succeed in his plea of double jeopardy. Standing in
his path is the "same evidence" test which has been a convenient loop-
hole for prosecutors for almost a century. The test goes back to Rex v.
Vandercomb & Abbott.61 In that case, the defendants had been charged
with nocturnal breaking and entering followed by larceny at that time.
As the facts were proven, however, it appeared that the larceny had
actually been committed on a prior day. Since they had not been in-
dicted for having stolen the goods at an earlier date, they were acquit-
ted, the court reasoning that "the form of the indictment decides the
question. ' 62 A second indictment was then brought which charged
defendants with breaking with intent to steal-thus, there was no need
to prove any actual larceny. A conviction resulted at the second trial.
In reply to defendant's contention that he had been placed in double
jeopardy, the court ruled that:
"Unless the first indictment was such as the prisoner might have
been convicted upon the proof of the facts contained in the second
indictment, an acquittal on the first indictment can be no bar to
the second." 63
The motive behind this narrow construction was the desire to allow
a changed legal construction to be applied to the same set of facts. The
essential elements of the evidence had not changed. It was the same
neighbor who testified in both proceedings. The difference lay only in
61. 2 Leach 708, 720, 168 Eng. Rep. 455, 461 (1796). While Re.%: v. Sheen, 2C.&P. 634,
172 Eng. Rep. 287 (1827) and King v. Clark, 1 Brod. & B. 473, 129 Eng. Rep. 804 (1820)
do not recognize the authority of the Vrandercomb case, the doctrine seems firmly established
in Great Britain since Regina v. Reid, 5 Cox C.C. 104 (1851); see, e.g., Re.% v. Kupferberg, 13
Crim.App.R. 166 (1918) (conspiracy acquittal no bar for charge of aiding and abetting
commission of crime). Later courts have used the converse of the Vandercomb rule in order
to determine when two offenses are the same; the rule is stated to be that if the fact sufficient
to support the second indictment would have warranted a conviction on the first indictment
the two offenses are the same; see, e.g., State v. Browmrigg, 87 Me. 500, 33 Atl.11 (1895).
62. 2 Leach 708, 711, 168 Eng. Rep. 455,457 (1796).
63. 2 Leach 708, 720, 168 Eng. Rep. 455, 461 (1796); there are some utterances of
eighteenth century legal writers to the same effect: 2 H.!wENs, PLEAS OF THE CROWN C.
35, 3 (1724); for an earlier case using the offense concept for the purpose of alloving a ne.
trial, see Rex v. Turner, Kelyng 30, 84 Eng. Rep. 1068 (1664). Bid see Rex v. Segar &
Potter, Comb 401, 90 Eng. Rep. 554 (1696) (indictment for burglary-taking money to
considerable value-acquittal for variance (daytime); new indictment for brealing during
daytime and taking to the value of five shillings; majority held "they could not be indicted
anew for the same fact").
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the change of the legal qualification-from burglary accompanied by
larceny to burglary with intent to steal-made necessary by the fact
that there was no proof of actual taking. The same evidence test does
not purport, therefore, to ferret out any difference in the respective
modes of criminal behavior. It compares the two indictments in
order to determine whether the second indictment became necessary
because the first judge failed to convict when he could have, if he had
only explored all possibilities inherent in the first indictment. Only if
the purpose of the second indictment could have been reached under
the first indictment would double jeopardy attach to the new pro-
ceedings under the same evidence test." As a 19th century decision
expresses it:
"The question is not whether the same facts are offered in proof
to sustain the second indictment as were given in the first trial, but
whether the facts are so combined and charged in the second indict-
ment as to constitute the same offense." 11
Apart from a number of qualifications and exceptions to be dealt with
later, any one of the numerous variants of Rex v. Vandercomb is still the
majority theory for determining the existence of double jeopardy.60
The comparison between separate counts or indictments, as the case
may be, remains decisive.
Basic to an understanding of the same evidence test is the idea that
the defendant is indicted not for reprehensible action in the past, but
only for a definite offense, carved out by the prosecution from the in-
criminating historical incident. When the allegedly criminal act is
brought under the legal theory, it loses its natural character and be-
comes part of the world of legal fiction. Some of its elements are cut
off as legally irrelevant; others of secondary importance in the history
of the perpetrator are played up; all this in order to fit the legal jacket
in which the prosecution wants to present the crime. This procedure
is not without its dangers. The legal theory advanced in the indict-
ment may prove untenable in the light of the partial reenactment of
the story in court. But why is this transformation from the realm of
the original transaction to the legal category of the specific crime not
of a tentative nature only? Why is it not understood only as an attempt
at categorization subject to modification at a later stage of the trial so
long as the basis, the incriminating act, remains the same?
The answer must be sought in the test's historical development. It
belongs to the heritage of extreme formalism transmitted to its heirs
64. This clausula salvatoria is already in essence contained in Rex v. Vandercomb's
criticism of the Turner case, 2 Leach 708, 718, 168 Eng. Rep. 455,460 (1796).
65. Commonwealth v. Clair, 89 Allen 525 (Mass. 1863).
66. On these variants see Note, 7 BROonimyx L. Rav. 79, 83, 86 (1937); Comment
57 YALE L. J. 132, 134 (1947).
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by 18th century criminal procedure. Invention of the same evidence
test furnished courts, hemmed in by a rigid procedure, with an ex-
tremely useful technique for allowing new proceedings against those
who had been acquitted because of the difference between allegation
and proof-variance. Thus, the formalism of procedural devices favor-
ing the defendant, 7 like variance, was checked by the adoption of the
equally formalistic device which favored the prosecution-the same
evidence test. Apparently, the test was a tortuous attempt to escape
the restrictions inherent in the offense category and instead to assure
the prosecution that the totality of criminal activity would be available
for use against the defendant." Comfort was also given to the prosecu-
tion by the constitutional doctrine of the time. The "nature and cause"
of the accusation which had to be communicated to the defendant were
interpreted in the light of the offense concept rather than related to the
broader act category. 9 The prosecuting agency could therefore safely
restrict the factual recital of the defendant's misdeed to those frag-
ments which fitted the theory it chose to proffer in the indictment.
Constitutional dogma and judicial creation thus merged-the result
was frequent avoidance of the double jeopardy rule by invocation of a
new theory in a subsequent indictment.
Limitations of the same evidence test
Courts soon began to realize that strict application of the same
evidence test would force them to refuse to grant defendant's pleas of
double jeopardy in the overwhelming majority of cases-often un-
justifiably. Some attempt was therefore made to limit the conse-
quences of the test's application. Four major approaches are discerni-
ble: (a) the "necessarily included offense" rule, (b) specific legislative
enactments, (c) the "Rutledge doctrine," and (d) the maxim of res
judicata.
a) Necessarily included offense rule. The first limiting qualification
would seem to arise from the various greater-lesser offense and "neces-
sarily included" offense concepts. But it hardly qualifies as an "ac-
cepted escape" 70 because it applies to only a small number of cases,
and categories covered by it remain uncertain. For example, it does
not encompass those cases in which the commission of one offense
ordinarily presupposes the commission of another associated offense 71
67. For the criticism of a then contemporary author, cf. 2 HALE, PLE,%s o Taz Cnov 
193 (1694).
68. Hall, Objectives of Federal Criminal Procedural Retision, 51 Y'ALE L. J. 723, 740
(1942).
69. Rex v. Wilkes, 4 Burr. 2527, 2568, 98 Eng. Rep. 327, 351 (1770); ex parte Bain,
121 U.S.1 (1886).
70. Rutledge, J. in District of Columbia v. Bucley, 128 F.2d17, 21 (App. D.C. 1942)
(concurring opinion), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 358 (1942).
71. See discussion of "consumption" on page 518 supra.
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-hence the many attempts to bring the latter class within the pur-
view of the recognized exceptions to the same evidence rule.72 So also,
this exception to the same evidence test does not seem to include the
relation of manslaughter to the cluster of offenses connected with the
keeping and driving of motor vehicles, which were created to minimize
the danger of manslaughter; 13 acquittal on the manslaughter charge
does not mean the lesser offenses will not be called into play later.74
Moreover, a host of additional difficulties arise whenever the first
indictment included only the lesser offense. 5 Courts have barred
prosecutions for the greater offense after a prior trial for the "included"
offense; and statutory provisions directing judges to remand cases
where the facts proved would constitute a greater crime-in order to
have the defendant reindicted for the greater offense 7'-have been
ignored. However, a new trial will not be barred if the consequences
of the criminal act, which become apparent only after the first trial,
are likely to result in a higher qualification of the same act.77 A ma-
jority of courts likewise refuse to grant double jeopardy pleas in cases
in which the lower court lacked jurisdiction for the greater offense. 78
It seems that the "included offense" rule derives from a laudable
attempt to protect the defendant but its lack of sharp logical contours
has caused it to flounder in a hopelessly contested field of application.79
72. See e.g., the "integrated" offense doctrine expounded in People v. Weinstock, 55
N.Y.S.2d 330, (Sup. Ct. 1945) (abortion-practice of medicine without license); see also
Cain v. United States, 19 F.2d 472 (8th Cir. 1927).
73. State v. Hiatt, 187 Wash. 226,60 Pac. 2d 71 (1936); Notes, 172 A.L.R. 1053 (1948).
74. People v. Trantham, 24 Cal. App. 2d 177, 74 P.2d 851 (1937); Florida v. Bacon,
30 S.2d 744 (Fla. 1947).
75. People v. Crupa, 64 Cal. App. 2d 592, 605, 149 P.2d 416, 424 (1944) (dissenting
opinion).
76. People v. Hunckeler, 48 Cal. 331 (1874); People v. Karney, 81 Misc. 981, 44 N.Y.S.
2d691 (Supp. Ct. 1943); Note 44 COL.L.REv. 87 (1944). But see Bone v. State, 43 Okl. Cr.
Rep. 360, 279Pac. 363 (1929) (implicitly recognizing power of court to discharge defendant
for assault and to seek new indictment for murder).
77. People v. Dugas, 310 I1. 261, 141 N.E. 769 (1923); People v. Harrison, 395 I1.
463, 70 N.E.2d 596 (1947), see footnote 98 infra.
78. Commonwealth v. Bergen, 134 Pa. Super. 62, 4 A2d 164 (1939) (summary convic-
tion for reckless driving in Magistrate's Court no bar against new prosecution for involun-
tary manslaughter in higher court). But see People v. Trenkle, 169 Misc. 687, 9 N.Y.S. 2d
661 (Cty. Ct. 1938) (conviction in city police court for the misdemeanor of corrupting thild's
morals bars new trial for attempted rape in higher court). Courts' decisions rarely rest ex-
clusively on one or the other theoretical proposition; courts deny the plea if collusion or at
least a too great amount of defendant's initiative in bringing the case before the lower juris-
diction is found. In contrast, in People v. Trenkle, supra, one of the main reasons for up-
holding the plea was the absence of collusions and the State's full-fledged consent to proceed
before the Magistrate's Court. Id. at 696, 669.
79. For a survey of some of the exceptions "from the well established principle" of
necessary inclusion see People v. Herbert 51 P.2d 456,459 (Cal. Ct. of App. 1936) (dissenting
opinion).
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In its present state, it merely adds to the cacophony of muddled at-
tempts to solve the act-offense problem.
b) Legislative enactments. The second restriction placed on the same
evidence test is the outgrowth of specific legislative enactments. Penal
codes of several states contain provisions barring a second prosecution
for commission of an act which has been made criminal in several ways
by separate provisions.80 Such provisions do not lay down a rule of
interpretation as to what part of the criminal behavior to disregard
and what part to put on trial. Nor do they force the prosecuting
authorities to elect the theory on which they wish to proceed.8' Never-
theless, such statutes clearly run counter to the same evidence con-
cept; the category of act, not of offense, is used as a yardstick for ex-
cluding a second prosecution. Little wonder that this type of provision
has been given little effect. A few scattered decisions take it at its face
value, forbidding several sentences for identical acts, whether they are
contained in new indictments or in plural counts.82 Other decisions
have construed it as a legislative confirmation of the necessary inclu-
sion doctrine, ordering the courts to sentence only under the count
providing for the greatest punishment.83 But most often, courts have
shown a tendency either simply to disregard the statute or to brush it
off as incompatible with the same evidence rule.84
c) The "Rutledge doctrine." A novel attempt to narrow the applica-
tion of the same evidence test has recently been undertaken by Mr.
Justice Rutledge. Criticizing the accepted escape of the included
offense doctrine and the prevalent stress on the theoretical rather than
the factual separability of evidentiary facts, the Justice insisted on a
broadening of the court's function.85 He urged courts not to let matters
rest with the determination of whether there exists a difference (ascer-
80. REST..TEmENT, DOUBLE JEOPARDY, Commentary to § 22 (Official Draft 1935).
81. An earlier decision to the contrary: People v. Krank, 110 N.Y. 488, 18 N.E. 242
(1888) reversing 46 Hun. 632 (Sup. Ct. 1888), dates before the adoption of N.Y. Code Crim.
Proc. § 279a (1936).
82. State v. Gutke, 25 Id.37, 139 Pac. 346 (1914) (acquittal for selling beer to minors-
selling beer in violation of local option statute); People v. Fitzgerald, 101 Misc. 695, 163
N.Y.S. 930 (Cty. Ct. 1917) (speeding, general highway law-city ordinance); Crosswhite
v. State, 31 Ala. App. 181, 13 So.2d963 (1943) (assault with weapon-conspiracy for the
purpose of preventing carrying on a la-wful business).
83. People v. Heacox, 231 App.Div. 617, 247 N.Y.S. 464 (4th Dep't 1931); People v.
Murphy, People v. Goggin, 256 App.Div. 995, 10 N.Y.S.2d 586-7 (2d Dep't 1919), aff'd 281
N.Y. 611, 22 N.E.2d 17 (1939); People v. Green, 30 Adv. Cal.R. 593, 606, 184 Pac.2d 512,
519 (1947) (lascivious acts and rape-statutory inclusion of any acts or crimes upon the body
into lascivious acts for purpose of punishment; Cal. Pen. Code § 288 amend. 1937).
84. State v. Empey, 65 Utah 609, 239 Pac.25 (1925) (driving automobile when in-
toxicated-manslaughter); People v. Skarczwski, 178 Misc. 160, 33 N.Y.S.2d294 (Cty. Ct.
1942), aff'd, 287 N.Y. 826,41 N.E.2d 99 (1942).
85. District of Columbia v. Buckley, 128 F.2d17, 21 (App. D.C. 1942) (concurring
opinion), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 658 (1942).
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tained via the same evidence test) between the charged offenses. In-
stead, they should further inquirewhether the distinctions thus ferreted
out are "strong enough to overcome the constitutional guarantee,"
The proposal would be attractive if it provided a yardstick as to what
distinctions and refinements to consider slight or substantial. But as
framed by Justice Rutledge, the test would still permit the difference
between driving on the wrong side of the road and driving while in-
toxicated to be deemed substantial enough to warrant a new trial."
It is, moreover, subject to the basic and disquieting query: what has
the number of differences between the various offenses into which a
unified action can be split to do with the objective of protecting the
defendant against multiple prosecution of the same criminal behavior?
d) Res judicata. The maxim of res judicata has contributed some-
what to narrowing the field of application of the same evidence test in
double jeopardy cases. Few will deny that it is applicable in criminal
cases 87 and that it may be used to support either the state's or the
defendant's contentions." It has been used to exclude multiple prosecu-
tions against defendants who had injured several people by the same
act 9 and has also been resorted to in cases involving both multiple
consequence and self-defense aspects." However, in the majority of
multiple consequence cases, courts have failed to apply or even to
discuss resjudicata; instead, variants and combinations of the distinct
offense and multiple consequent doctrines have been used to justify
new prosecutions; 91 when new prosecutions are not permitted, same
transaction or single intent theories have furnished the justifying
rationales. 2
Application of res judicata is hampered further by the fact that,
86. Ibid.
87. United States v. Oppenheimer, 242 U.S. 85 (1916); Sealfon v. United States, 332
U.S. 575 (1947); Adkins v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 175 Va. 590, 9 SE.2d349 (1940);
Harris v. State, 193 Ga. 109, 121, 17 S.E.2d573, 581 (1941). But see Duvall v. State, 18
Ohio App. 657, 146 N.E.90 (1924). See also McLaren, The Doctrine of Res Judicala as
Applied to the Trial of Criminal Cases, 10 WAsH.L.R. 198, 202 (1935); Note, 7 BROOMY14
L.R. 79 (1937); Note, 24 MiNN. L.R. 522,558 (1940).
88. United States v. Meyerson, 24 F.2d855 (S.D. N.Y. 1928); People v. Majado, 22
Cal. App.2d323, 70 P.2d1015 (1937).
89. Jones v. State, 66 Miss. 380,6 So. 231 (1889).
90. Spannel v. State, 83 Tex. Crim. App. 418, 434, 203 S.W. 357, 364 (1918) (concur-
ring opinion) (acquittal of bystander for manslaughter implies determination of self-defenso
in regard to death of person affected by said self-defense).
91. State v. Taylor, 185 Wash. 198, 52 P.2d 1252 (1936); State v. Fredlund, 200 Minn.
44, 273 N.W. 353, (1937); People v. Allen, 368 Ili. 368, 14 N.E.2d 397, (1938) appeal dis.
missed for want ofjurisdiction, 308 U.S.511 (1939); State v. Melia, 231 Iowa 332, 1 N.W.2d
230 (1941); Note, 30 GEo. L.J. 574 (1942); in all four cases, acquittal for murder or man-
slaughter of one person was followed by a new trial for killing of another person as part of
same act.
, 92. State v. Cosgrave, 103 N.J.L. 412, 135 AtI, 871 (1927) (based on State v. Cooper-
identical act doctrine see note 7 supra).
[Vol. 58., $13
1949] THE ACT, THE OFFENSE AND DOUBLE JEOPARDY 533
without a special verdict in the first case, a dispute may arise as to
whether the allegations advanced in the second trial had clearly been
in issue in the first trial.9 3 The appellate judge may feel that whether
the first court actually decided a controverted question cannot be
decided in advance but must be left to the new trial court, sitting at
the second indictment. 4 Especially since Justice Holmes' defense of
inconsistent verdicts on different counts, in his last opinion in Dunn v.
United States, has the prospect of successfully limiting the same evi-
dence test by rex judicata become remote." In that case, the Court
had been asked to decide whether an acquittal for possessing and sell-
ing liquor and a conviction for the unlawful keeping of liquor for sale
were compatible with each other. The only proof of the unlawful keep-
ing was based on the one instance of possession and selling which had
been conclusively negated in the verdict. Justice Holmes, relying on
the same evidence test, brushed re judicata aside and arrived at the
illogical but convenient solution that verdicts on different counts of
the same judgment need not be consistent with each other. He cov-
ered up the result by insisting that findings of juries may not be dis-
turbed, intimating at the same time that inconsistency may be con-
venient where the jury sees no other way to reach a compromise on
the punishment they finally agree to inflict. Justice Butler's dissent,"
resting on an integral application of the re judicata concept to the
situation in question, has not left any trace in recent decisionsY7
Apparently, the hold of rex judicata over the province of criminal
law is an insecure and tenuous one.9" It may and has occasionally been
93. Peoplev. Pearson, 120 Misc. 377, 199 N.Y.S.4,8 (Cty. Ct. 1923); State v. Coblentz,
169 Md. 159, 180 A. 266 (1935); Note, 27 IowA L. REv. 649, 652 (1942).
94. United States v. Dockery, 49 F. Supp. 907 (E.D. N.Y. 1943).
95. Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390,393 (1931).
96. Id. at 398,403,407 (dissenting opinion).
97. Although prior to the decision in the Dunn case, there was a conflict of opinion as
to how far application of resjudicata would lead to a reversal of inconsistent verdicts--c'.
Boyle v. United States, 22 F.2d 547 (Sth Cir. 1927)-the Dunn rule seems to have settled
the question in favor of maintaining inconsistent verdicts in disregard of res judicala.
Pilgreen -. United States, 157 F.2d 427 (Sth Cir. 1946); Downing v. United States, 157
F.2d738 (Sth Cir. 1946); Mogoll v. United States, 158 F.2d792 (5th Cir. 1947); Weson v.
United States, 164 F.2d50 (8th Cir. 1947).
98. See People v. Harrison, 395 Ill. 463, 70 N.E.2d S96 (1947) (after acquittal of assault
with intent to kill, conviction on new murder indictment based on supervcning death of
victim; approved because the defendant at the time of the first proceeding could neither
have been prosecuted nor convicted for homicide; resjudicala had not been specially pleaded).
However, it seems dubious whether public policy would not have required the trial court to
take notice of the former adjudication, even if the question had not been raised by the
parties. See 2 FREEM"A, JUDGMENTS § SOS (5th ed. 1925). In the individual instance the
first acquittal might have rested on the State's failure to prove homicidal intent; under he
Illinois statute (Rev. Stat. (1945) c. 38, § 358) murder may be established without proof of
intent to kill, so that a second prosecution would not have necessarily been stopped. Note,
47 CoL.L.REv. 679 (1947); Note, 25 Cm-IENT REv. 243 (1947). For further restrictions of
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resorted to as an escape from some unfortunate consequences of the
same evidence test but, like the other limitations already discussed, it
does not loom large in the search for a rational solution of the double
jeopardy puzzle.
SUGGESTED SOLUTION OF THE ACT-OFFENSE PROBLEM: A MODIFIED
"SAME TRANSACTION" TEST AND LIBERALIZATION OF
AMENDMENT PRACTICE
While all these corollaries of the same evidence test lead only to a
haphazard narrowing of its scope, the "same transaction test," adopted
in some earlier British decisions 11 and also in a small and steadily
diminishing number of American courts, goes farther 110 and provides
an alternative solution. Under this test, a second prosecution is barred
when the proof shows that the second case concerns the "same transac-
tion" as the first. It is easily seen that this test, as it now stands, is a
"defendant's rule" 111 which would result in as much disadvantage for
the state as the same evidence test now carries for the defendant.
The apparent disadvantage to the prosecution can be remedied by
liberalization of amendment practice in criminal proceedings; 10 the
prosecution would then be permitted to amend the indictment as soon
as a factual basis therefor is made out at the trial. Such a course would
not only aid the court in its fact-finding process but would also assure
that all possible legal constructions of the set of facts would be tried
in the one proceeding. 03 Only in this way can development of fool-
the applicability of resjudicata in cases where the first judgment was tinged with perjury,
see People v. Housman, 44 Cal. App. 2d 619, 112 P. 2d 944 (1941), cert. denied, 314 U.S.
660 (1941); see also Note, 37 A.L.R. 1290 (1925).
99. Wemyss v. Hopkins, 10 Q.B. 378, 381 (1875) (cause damage to persons through
negligent or willful behavior and assault deemed "same identical matter").
100. Jones v. State, 19 Ala. App. 600, 99 So. 770 (1924), cert. denied, 211 Ala. 701, 99
So. 926 (1924) (Possession of liquor for sale-possession of liquor); Trawick v. Birmingham,
23 Ala. App. 308, 125 So. 211 (1929), cert. denied, 220 Ala. 291, 125 So. 312 (1929) (speed-
ing-driving an automobile while intoxicated); Grumley v. Atlanta, 68 Ga. App., 22 SE.2d
181 (1942) (recognizes the same transaction test, but denies its applicability to two instances
of disorderly conduct, committed at different places and with two to three hours interval
between them); People v. Webster, 269 App. Div. 887, 56 N.YS.2d 155 (3d Dept, 1945)
(Possession of burglary tools-unlawful entry).
101. Note 57 YALE L. J. 132, 137 (1947); see also Jones, What Constitutes Double Jeop-
ardy? 38 J. CR5. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 379, 384 (1947).
102. Note, 53 HARv.L.REv. 122, 127 (1939).
103. Miller v. United States, 133 Fed. 337, 347 (8th Cir. 1904). "It is seldom, if ever,
that any pleading so clearly and concisely states the alleged facts that it might not be im-
proved after the criticism of the assailant and the trial of a case. . . ." RADIN, LAW AS
LOGIC AND EXPERIENCE 67 (1940) calls the reconstruction of the facts "the impossible
thing"; FRANK, IF MEN WERE ANGELS 284 (1942) speaks of the "leaky characterof 'facts' tn
law suits." Williams v. United States, 168 U.S. 382, 389 (1897); United States v. Hutcheson,
312 U.S. 219, 229 (1941); and People v. Resnick, 21 N.Y.S.2d 483 (City Mag.Ct. 1940)
carry the principle that incorrect citation of statutes is immaterial if allegation of facts make
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proof guarantees against repeated adjudication of the same transactionbe assured.
In addition, the scope of permissible variance between allegation
and proof-indictment and evidence-must be widened. Materiality
of variance should depend exclusively on whether substantial rights
of the defendant are affected. The admissibility or inadmissibility of
a claim of variance can therefore not be answered in the abstract; it
depends on the circumstances of the case, with remote contingencies
excluded from consideration. 1 4 Given increased possibilities of amend-
ing charges and defenses, and a liberal allowance of variance, the act-
offense problem would be far along the road to solution."'
Any attempt at remedial action by way of amendment of indict-
ments must meet the traditional requirement of grand jury participa-
tion in the formulation of indictments. If grand jury approval is
necessary for indictments, any amendment as to substance also has to
be submitted to the grand jury.' Under the influence of the Wilkds
case 107 and the ex parte Bain "Is doctrine, current practice, illustrated
by the federal rules of criminal procedure, differentiates between
amendment of indictments and amendment of informations."' Only
the latter may be amended, though even here the adding of a new
offense is usually excluded." 0 Occasional attempts have been made
a case under a different statute; not quite in harmony with the heavy emphasis on the offense
category, these cases stress the alleged facts, not the cited offense, as controlling factors.
Cf. Dession, Te ,New Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 11, 56 Y,%Lr L. J. 197, 206 (1947).
104. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 82 (1935). But cf. Kotteakos v. United States,
328 U.S. 750, 757, 777 (1946) which shows that there may be considerable dispute as to what
constitutes "relevant" variance in conspiracy cases, when the attempt is made to establish
one conspiracy by way of a "theoretical" consensus; see also Brooks v. United States, 164
F.2d 142 (5th Cir. 1947) utilizing the severer yardstick of the Supreme Court majority in
the Kotteakos case. Outside the contested conspiracy field, no such difficulties exist in differ-
entiating between relevant and irrelevant variance; see, e.g., Nigro v. United States, 117
F.2d 624 (8th Cir. 1941); State v. Myers, 118 W.Va. 397, 190 S.E. 678 (1937).
105. As far back as 75 years ago, a European observer found one favorable factor on the
double jeopardy horizon-a growing insight into the interdependence of the double jeop-
ardy problem and the radius of permissible variance. See Glaser, Die Durchfuehrung der
Regel "ze bis in idem" im Englischen und Franzoesischen Strafprocess, 22 GERICInSSAAL 1, 16
(1870).
106. Commonwealth v. Snow, 269 Mass. 598, 169 N.E. 542 (1930).
107. Rex v. Wilkes, 4 Burr. 2527, 256S, 98 Eng.Rep. 327,350-1(1770).
108. Ex parle Bain, 121 U.S. 1 (1886); see also Jones v. Robbins, 8 Gray 329, 342 (Mass.
1857).
109. United States v. Fawcett, 115 F.2d 764 (3rd Cir. 1940); Edgerton v. United States,
143 F.2d 697 (9th Cir. 1944); Note, 7 A.L.R. 1516 (1920).
110. FED.R.CRn.P., 7(c) allows for amendment if no additional or different offense is
charged and if substantial rights of the defendant are not affected. See Muncy v. United
States, 289 Fed. 780 (4th Cir. 1923) (adding sales count to prior count charging unlawful
possession of liquor and maintenance of a nuisance); Walker v. United States, 7 F.2d 309,
(9th Cir. 1925) (adding manufacturing count to count charging possession of property
designed for manufacture).
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to whittle down the ex parte Bain doctrine,' but a frontal attack,
based on allowing the court to amend the indictment by adding new
counts describing the same transaction, has only been faced in one
jurisdiction; 112 and judicial interpretation has largely emasculated
that particular attempt."'
Nevertheless, a more liberal practice is beginning to develop in the
very area which gave rise to the ex parte Bain doctrine-the partial
striking of counts. In the Bain case, the court rested its opposition to
such striking on the purely conjectural contention that the grand jury
findings which supported the indictment might have been based on
the stricken part." 4 In contrast, recent cases look only to possible
injury to rights of the accused as the criterion for permitting partial
111. See Salinger v. United States, 272 U.S. 542, 549 (1926) (withdrawal of all counts
but one from the jury deemed no alteration of indictment); Ford v. United States, 273 U.S.
593, 597, 602 (1926) (striking out of a useless averment admissible, even though defense re-
garded it as the essence of the charge as formulated by the grand jury): Ralston v. Cox, 123
F.2d 196, 198 (5th Cir. 1941) (concurring opinion).
112. Commonwealth v. Snow, 269 Mass. 598, 169 N.E. 542 (1930) (statute allowing for
unspecified amendment of indictment interpreted as intended to authorize only amendment
of form). By N. Y. CODE CRJm. PROC. § 295 (j) upon the trial of an indictment, the court
may, if the defendant cannot be thereby prejudiced in his defense on the merits, direct the
indictment to be amended according to the proof. Postponement of the trial may be or-
dered-to be resumed before the same or such other jury as the court may deem reasonable
and new counts may be added where it is made to appear that the crimes to be charged
therein relate to the transaction upon which the defendant stands indicted.
113. Although decisions applying or refusing to apply § 2950) of N.Y. CoDE CRIN. Pnoc.
may be conveniently distinguished from each other, the trend to narrow down its field of
application, short of declaring it unconstitutional, is unmistakable. See People v, La Bar-
bera, 159 Misc. 177, 287 N.Y.S. 257 (S.Ct. 1936), rev'd on other grounds, 249 App. Div. 254,
292 N.Y.S. 518 (S.Ct. 1936) (District Attorney's motion to change indictment from burning
uninhabited building to burning building in curtilage of inhabited building denied, as grand
jury minutes contain no reference to surroundings of burned buildings-no question of ad-
missibility of change from one to another theory raised). Also see People ex rel. Prince v.
Brophy, 273 N.Y. 90, 6 N.E. 2d 109 (1937) (discussing § 2950) but resting mainly on de-
fendant's consent to amendment). But cf. People ex rel. Battista v. Christian, 249 N.Y.
314, 164 N.E. 111 (1928) (waiver of grand jury indictment inadmissible); People v. Resnick,
21 N.Y.S. 2d 483 (City Mag.Ct. 1940) (amendment to complaint so as to embrace different
sections of administrative code held admissible under § 2956). In addition, see People v,
Miles, 289 N.Y. 360, 365, 45 N.E. 2d 910, 913 (1942) (new count charging contriving for-
bidden lottery on May 9th, added to counts charging contriving lottery on May 3d and
bribing police officers on May 9th held to charge new transaction and to constitute substan-
tive amendment forbidden by grand jury requirement); People ex rel. Wachowicz v, Martin,
293 N.Y. 361, 57 N.E. 2d 53 (1944) (grand larceny second degree indictment to which de-
fendant pleaded guilty not included in receiving for which he was indicted, no amendment
was sought therefore, conviction was had for entirely different crime than the one contained
in the indictment-however, § 2956) would at any rate, given grand jury requirement, not
have conferred power of amendment).
114. Ex parte Bain, 121 U.S. 1, 10 (1887); Dodge v. United States, 258 Fed. 300 (2nd
Cir. 1919); Edgerton v. United States, 143 F.2d 697 (9th Cir. 1944).
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striking." 5 Strildng out part of a count is thus assimilated to the
generally permitted withdrawal of the whole or part of the charge.,
Why not extend this liberalized practice of amendment (by striking
parts of a count) to the more important area of amendment by adding
a new count? Since the grand jury argument is the chief obstacle, it
might be useful to inquire for a moment into the part played by that
body in the formulation of the indictment. The grand jury takes no
interest in anything but the broadest and most cursory outline of the
facts as presented by the district attorney. It does not go into the
details of the evidence assembled by the prosecution; and any idea that
the grand jury, whether in colonial "1 or modem days, ever concerned
itself with the various theories under which a case may be presented,
seems to confound an assembly of bewildered laymen with a law school
seminar."' According to available evidence, the grand jury hqs noth-
ing to do with the technical drawing up of the charges. Wayne Morse
reported in 1929 that in only 2.92% of 7441 cases submitted to the
grand jury, did it feel compelled to alter the charge as proposed by the
district attorney.' Significantly enough, most of these few changes
had been proposed by the district attorney's office. Motivation for
such change was most often the necessity to fit the indictment to the
most recent evidence. Next in importance were political pressure and
bargaining moves between prosecutor and defendant. 'Y This com-
prehensive study never even mentioned the possibility that the grand
jury, whose scrutiny of the average case takes less than 30 minutes,
might develop ideas of its own as to what legal pigeon-holes would best
fit the criminal transaction. Whatever disagreement has developed
between grand jury and prosecutor appears to have revolved around
questions of sufficiency of proof rather than the particular theory of
the accusation.12 1 Since, apparently, the grand jury does not concern
itself with the legal theory applicable to a case, a change in this theory
via amendment, accompanied only by a reshuffling of the very evidence
115. United States v. Krepper, 159 F.2d 958 (3d Cir. 1946) (striking out of the words
"in furtherance of a joint or common scheme or enterprise" from substantive charge ad-
missible, as indictment was filed together with separate conspiracy charge and no doubt
could therefore exdst as to the definite offense for which the defendant had been tried).
116. Salinger v. United States, 272 U.S.542 (1926); Mellor v. United States, 160 F.2d
757, 763 (8th Cir. 1947).
117. GOEBEL & NAUGHTOx, LAW ENFORCEMENT n; COLOx:AL NEW Yonn 352, 353
n.97, 355 (1944) ("Thetask of transmitting the informal compositionsof the grand jurorsinto
the stiff and resistant phrases of an indictment vwas allotted to the attorney general." bid.
at 352).
118. Note 53 HARv.L.Rxv. 122, 129 (1939).
119. Morse, A Survey offhe Grand Jury System, 10 ORE. L. REv. 101,217, 295 (1931).
120. Id. at 158-160.
121. In 5.39% of the cases submitted, the grand jury adjudged the proofs to be insuf-
ficient. Id. at 154.
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presented to the grand jury, would not result in any disadvantage to
the accused.
The grand jury argument as a barrier to amendments of substance
should be reduced to its correct proportions. It should not be con-
strued as an absolute impediment, but should only lead to the pro-
hibition of variance where there exists a reasonable presumption that
the grand jury might not have brought the particular indictment if the
amended version had been originially presented to it. The constitu-
tional gaurantee should enter into play only if the amendment attempts
to extend the scope of the indictment to a transaction which had not
been examined by the grand jury. Invocation of constitutional doctrine
to prohibit changes which the grand jury would never notice seems like
creating a constitutional issue out of a small procedural niche."'
122. The liberal amendment practice of FED. R. Civ. P., 15 (a) allows a party to amend
his pleading by leave of court, freely to be given, "when justice so requires." The test of
"a departure from law to law" as the boundary line of permissible amendment had earlier
been abandoned; see Justice Cardozo in United States v. Memphis Cotton Oil Co., 288 U.S.
62, 68 (1933); International Ladies Garment Workers Union v. Donnelly Garment Co., 121 F.
2d 561 (8th Cir. 1941). In Great Britain, the Indictment Act had provided that an amend-
ment was, for the purposes of all proceedings, to be treated "as having been found by the
grand jury in amended form" 5 & 6 GEo. V, c. 90, § 5 (2) (1915); the liberal amendment a1l-
lowance of c. 90 § 5 had, however, been restricted in the court practice; see Rex v. Errington,
16 Cr. App. R. 148 (1922), Rex v. Hughes, 20 Cr. App. R. 4 (1927). More recently, the grand
jury has altogether been abolished from the largest province of criminal law. MISCEALLAN-
OUS PROVISIONS AcT c. 36, § 2 (1933); for the amendment practice under this act see Rex v.
Cleghorn, 3 All Eng. 398 (1938) (one count of conspiracy may be divided up into several);
Halsted v. Clark, K.B. 250 (1944) (court refuses to grant leave to amend because no evidence
has been adduced to prove charge if amended, no new indictment resting on refused amend-
ment admissible).
The Anglo-American dichotomy between act and offense with its ensuing consequences
of legal insecurity and repetitious litigation has a counterpart in the French distinction
between "fait materiel et fait juridique." It was early recognized that all courts, including
the assizes, have the right to consider an accusation under new viewpoints which may come
up during the trial and which may lead to a legal characterization different from the one
used in the accusation. 4 GA,.RAuD, INSTRUCTION CRImINELLE 344-347 (1926); 2 ?oITv.VIN,
CODE D'INsWRucrxoN CRIMINELLE 288 (1926). However, courts have sanctioned new ac-
cusations deriving from the identical facts both after prior conviction and acquittal; Cour do
Cassation, 19. XII. 1935, S 37.1.237; 30.1.1937 S 39.1.193. As to jury acquittals, courts
have argued that the president of the jury, though authorized to submit subsidiary questions
not contained in the original accusation, has no duty to do so. As a matter of fact, this
rationalization served the purpose of combating the laxity of the juries by allowing the same
charge to be taken to a lower court though not to a new jury. The law of November 25, 1941
has replaced the old assizes with a more bureaucratized institution where judges and jurors
deliberate together on questions of guilt and sentence, submitted by the president. In con-
sequence, the finality of judgments could now be restored and article 359, now 360 cod. proc,
crim. has been changed so as to exclude the possiblity of bringing an acquitted defendant to
trial again for the identical facts. DONNEDIEU DE VARBRES, TllAITL Dt DROn' CRI,:IN r,
ET DE LEGIS.ATIO N PENALE COmPARLE 820,884-887 (3d ed. 1947).
Under German law the court has the duty of examining the facts on which the accusa
tion rests under all legal viewpoints as they appear during the trial; the court is not linited
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Moreover, the grand jury argument should have lost some of its
power since the arrival on the scene of the short form of indictment
which may be supplemented by a bills of particulars. Under this
practice, both the theory of the indictment and specific allegations may
be relegated to the bill of particulars. Legislatures have effected this
shift of emphasis in spite of the theoretical .possibility that the pros-
ecution might abuse its right and smuggle into the bill of particulars
some material which had never been covered by the grand jury.12 3 It
would seem that the only limits upon utilization of short form indict-
ments rest not upon the grand jury requirement, but rather upon the
need to keep a precise statement of facts to satisfy the constitutional
double jeopardy guarantee. 124  In the light of such developments,
there would seem to be no reason why admission or prohibition of
amendments should not depend exclusively on the presence or absence
of disadvantage to the defendant.
The Continuous Offense Concept
There remains one more obstacle to the concentration of all pro-
ceedings for one act in the same trial and the consequent replacing of
the same evidence by the same transaction test. The "transaction"
as a yardstick of double jeopardy remains vague when the criminal
by the theory of the accusation; the rights of the accused are preserved by the court's duty
to allow the defendant all latitude for preparing a new defense including, if need be, the
possibility of a continuance. STrAFREcETSPFLEGE VERoRD,%UN 1946 (U.S. Zone of Oc-
cupation) STRAFPROZESSORDNUNG cj J 264, 265. On the other hand, this principle is accom-
panied by a rather strict application of ne bis in idens, the prohibition of a second accusation
for the same identical fact; on the whole problem as well as in the recognized exceptions of
the ne bis in idem rule, see GUENDEL-HARTUNG--LINGE NN-NIE!i--!IER, STPAF-
PROZESSORDING 504-514 (19th ed. 1934); HIPPEL, DER DUtrrscua SrT,%Fnozcss 369
(1941).
Though German law does not control the procedure before allied tribunals against
German defendants, it might be useful to point out that German law, like Anglo-American
law, would not allow a second trial for identical facts aimed at correcting possible adminis-
trative mistakes of a reviewing officer authorized to scale down sentences. Whether military
tribunals are exercising German jurisdiction via the assumption of German sovereignty or
whether they are deemed to remain foreign authorities, German law would seem to exclude
a new trial before German criminal courts under either circumstance. FnANu, Srwaxu5rz-
BUCH 3 b to 5 (18th ed. 1931). To what extent different considerations may apply when
the subsequent proceedings are of administrative rather than of criminal nature is discufzed
i IrITrELBAcH, DER VERBRAUGH DER STRAFELAGE BEr ORG. qIsATIONSvRBRECEu,
2 DIE SPRUCHGERICEiTE 310 (Deutschland, 1943).
123. People v. Bogdanoff, 254 N.Y. 16,39, 171 N.E. 890, 899 (1930) (dissenting opinion).
124. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 558 (1875); People cx rel. Hirschberg v.
Supreme Court of New York, 269 N.Y. 392, 199 N.E. 634 (1936) (grand jury minutes' ian-
spection may become necessary under short form indictment in order to identify subject of
charge); State v. Varnado, 203 La. 319, 358, 23 So. 2d 196, 119 (1945) (dissenting opinion);
see also Comment, Indicinent Forms-A Technical Loophole for 11w Accused, 6 L,,.L.Rcv.
461,466 (1946).
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objective is not planned to be executed within a more or less definite
time limit or within a narrow area but extends over a considerable time
or space. 125 It contrasts unfavorably in this regard with the easy de-
limitation of 'the offense concept utilized in the same evidence test,
Where, for double jeopardy purposes, should the boundary line be
drawn between several independent acts for which several prosecutions
should lie and one continuous transaction consisting of several acts
antedating the indictment?
It is the concept of "continuous offense" which remedies the vague-
ness of the transaction category. Within this category are cohabitation
with more than one wife,1 6 maintaining a nuisance, 127 desertion and
neglect to provide,1 28 receiving stolen goods, 29 engaging in professional
activities without a license, 3 ' connecting a burner with a pipe of a gas
company,' 3 ' driving a car while under the influence of liquor," 2 con-
tinued agreement to commit several substantive crimes.133 All involve
a state of affairs created by defendant in violation of the law. In some
of these cases, the defendant, after having once acted, would have to
take positive measures to terminate a situation which he had created
in the past. Such offenses are continuing by the very nature of the
action or inaction involved. 134 Others, like larceny and embezzlement,
mnay be described as continuing offenses only under certain circum-
stances, i.e., if performed at regular intervals with the same technique
and exploiting the same general opportunity.'35
When trying to define the limits of the continuing offense concept
and therewith the limits of double jeopardy protection, jurists have
tended to emphasize the importance of uninterrupted action, 130 But
125. Harris v. State, 193 Ga. 109, 116, 17 S.E. 2d 573, 578 (1941).
126. In re Snow, 120 U.S. 274 (1887).
127. People v. Brooklyn & Queens Transit Co., 283 N.Y. 484, 28 N.E. 2d 925 (1940),
128. Commonwealth v. McClelland, 109 Pa.Sup. Ct. 211,167 Atl. 367 (1933).
129. State v. Schneller, 199 La. 811, 822, 7 So. 2d 66, 70 (1942) (concurring opinion).
130. People ex rel. Seligson v. Anderson, 50 N.Y.S. 2d 856 (County Ct. 1944).
131. Woodsv. People, 222 Ill. 293, 78 N.E. 607 (1906); Note, 113 A.L.R. 1282 (1938).
132. State v. Licari, 132 Conn. 220, 43 A. 2d 450 (1945); but see Hall v. State, 73 Ga.
App. 616, 618, 37 S.E.2d545, 546 (1946).
133. Braverman v. United States, 317 U.S. 49 (1942).
134. State v. Peters, 43 Idaho 564, 253 Pac. 842 (1927); Note, 40 Mic .L.Rfv, 429
(1942).
135. Sometimes a further differentiation is made between continuous offense and con.
tinuing offense, d~lit continu et dlit permanent, forigeselzde Handlung und Dauerdelikt. The
first one would include repeat performances of roughly similar nature, whereas the second
one would rest on one action with a continuing result. See DONNEDIEU DrI VADRES, TRAITI
DE DROIT CRIMINEL ET DE LAGISLATION PENALE COMPARPLE 108 (3d ed. 1947) Scuottucr-,
STRAFGESETZBUCH 235 (3d ed. 1947); HAFFTER, LEHRBUCH DES ScwEizERISCH9N STRAF-
R cH-s, allgemeiner Teil 345 (2d ed. 1946).
136. The Italian doctrine has extensively considered the problem of continuous crime.
For most of the writers, the problem of time interval was of primordeal inportance. Comp.
BALDUS C.VI. 2.4. Bartolus seems to have been the first to have emphasized the problem of
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it is rather the subjective element, the fact that the specific intent
loses its independence and becomes as mechanical and repetitious as
the sequent acts themselves, which should help to define the boundary
between separable and inseparable offenses.1 7 In addition, if the ex-
ternal situation varies and new elements enter into the picture, ter-
minating the mechanically repeated performance, continuity would
clearly be interrupted. Another dividing line is drawn by the indict-
ment itself. The protection afforded by the application of the con-
tinuing offense concept extends only to the period prior to the first in-
dictment. Acts occuring after the framing of the indictment, even if
they constitute nothing more than a direct continuation of the activ-
"impetus" rather than the time element. BARTOLUS D. XLVII. 1.2.5. As to the influence
which the doctrine exercised on Italian statutory law comp. DAi, Ds Snuarnmcat
ITALIENS 1 ! AUSGEHEDEN MITrELALTER 245-248 (1931). The present Italian Code
(1931) deals explicitly with continuous offenses. Art 87 (3) decrees: in case the same pro-
vision of the criminal law has been violated several times with the same purpoze, although at
different times, one single punishment applies, even if the different acts have been of vurying
gravity. In this case, the punishment of the most serious violation may be increased three-
fold. See 3 MAkNzm, Dxrro PENALE 541 (1931). In France, the continuous crime is re-
garded as a plurality of criminal offenses. However, art. 351 of the CODE CnRI. Proc. allows
only for one punishment in case of a plurality of criminal acts, to be taken from the severer
law. See 3 GAP.RAuD, Dnorr PsnA.. FRARc.us 183 (1913); DONNEDIEU DE VABPXS, TAITwr
DE DROIT CumrnxuL ET DIE LAGISLATION PEN.uL COMPARIE 463 (3d ed. 1947).
The new Swiss Penal Code (1937) provides the same treatment for the competition of
norms as well as of acts-invocation of the heaviest punishment. Continuous crime, treated
more extensively in the now abrogated cantonal penal codes, is only mentioned by way of
the statute of limitation. Art. 71, III. The practice recognizes and applies the concept
whenever unity of intention and a certain time connection prevails. See 1 Tnon ;!Lml,:-
OVERBECH, SCnaERZEISCn-S STRAGESTZMBUCH 63 (1940).
The German theory and practice has recognized continuous crime without exprezs
statutory authority. But relatively early, the practice developed the significent reztriction
that in matters of life, health and honor, claim of continuity is not admiz.ible. See 31
ENTsCHEIDUNGEN DES lREICSGERICHTS IN STRAFSACEMN 150 (May 13, 1898); 70 id. at 243
(June 11, 1936); 70 id. at 283 (Aug. 13, 1936); ScHOENrE, STrA wcs;Es Buca 234 (3d ed.
1947). These courts which are disapproved by the framers of the theory-FA=n; SrnVous-
Erznum 240 (lSth ed. 1931); MEZGER, STRF. iEcfr 466 (1931)-try to differentiate b-
tween an intention directed from the very beginning towards the execution of several sim-
ilar acts and a mere general scheme of using any available opportunity for repeat perform-
ances. 70 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES REICHSGERICHTS IN STRAFSACIIEN 51 (Jan. 13, 1936). A
further restriction derives from the exclusion of a continuity relation betw:'een negligent and
intentional acts. 73 ENTSCHMUlNGEN DES REICnSGERICHTS IN STRAFSAC1E; 230 (Aug. 6,
1939). All these restrictive devices together with "the healthy feeling of the people" have
been used by the former Supreme Court in order to stop a noticeable lower court trend
towards making extensive or, as the Supreme Court puts it, "immoderate" use of the con-
tinuous offense concept. 73 ENTScHEMUNGEN DES REICnGERCETS IN Sm SACH-ZN 164
(Mar. 31, 1939).
137. People v. Dillon, 1 Cal. App. (2d) 224,36 P. 2d 416 (1934) (intent vs. time element,
-adding value of received goods so as to constitute higher degree of larceny or heeping them
separate so as to justify conviction for petit larceny). People v. Cox, 286 N.Y. 137, 36 N.E.
2d84 (1941); Contra: Smith v. State, 59 Ohio 350, 52 N.E. 826 (1898).
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ities previously charged, would not be protected against a new pros-
ecution,.""
CONCLUSION
Procedural tools for concentrating adjudication are being found or
created in increasing number and are the necessary preliminary to
adoption of the transaction test. Counts describing the same trans-
action as various offenses may now be cumulated in a single indict-
ment and no premature election need be made. " In addition, "lump-
ing statutes," 140 designed to cover closely connected types of criminal
behavior, are contributing towards the same goal. What is still missing,
however, is the adoption of a more liberal amendment practice, allowing
the prosecution full freedom to change the legal theory on which the
accusation rests. Such a change would be far from disadvantageous
to the defendant. It would give him a firm legal basis for protection
against any attempt of the prosecution to utilize the act-offense di-
chotomy for a new prosecution, since all its legitimate aims could have
been reached by way of amendment. Under such practice, double
jeopardy would attach to any attempt to frame a new indictment for
the identical transaction adjudicated in the prior proceedings, without
regard to whether the prosecution did or did not make use of the lib-
eralized procedural devices to adjudicate the whole transaction in the
same trial.
But, would not the iron-clad guarantee against a new trial for the
identical set of facts, which the application of the transaction test
would provide, require a second protective device for the state in ad-
dition to a liberalization of amendment practice? Is it not a well known
fact that prosecutors often utilize the "different offense"-"same
evidence" technique only in order to further the goals of justice, i.e.,
where the previous proceedings have ended with a legally unjustifiable
acquittal which cannot be reversed due to statutory prohibition of
state appeals? The argument is surely not without merit.141 Since
the Palko case, however, states without a constitutional double jeop-
ardy clause may institute state appeals without having to meet the
138. Wilson v. Cooper, 249 Ky. 132, 60 S.W.2d 359 (1933) (previous conviction for ob-
structing the passway with a fence no bar to new prosecution for maintaining the fence nfter
the first conviction).
139. Pierce v. United States, 160 U.S. 355 (1896); State v. Baily, 50 Ohio St. 636, 36
K.E. 233 (1893); People v. Weill, 243 Ill. 208, 90 N.E. 731 (1909); People v. Tinnell, 385
i1. 537, 53 N.E.2d 427 (1944).
140. See, e.g., KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 21-553 (Corrick, 1935); MICIIAEL-WECIISLUR,
CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ADMINISTRATION 546-47 (1940); for the corresponding British
practice see KENNY, OUTLINES OF CRIMINAL LAW 553-54 (15th ed. 1936).
141. Steffen, Concerning Double Jeopardy and the New Rules, 7 FED. B. 3. 86 (1945).
See Peters, Double Jeopardy-Appeals by Prosecution, 9 DETROIT L.J. 93 (1946); Jones,
What Constitutes Double Jeopardy? 38 J.CRIM.L. & CRIMINOLOGY 379 (1947).
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objection that such procedure would contravene the guarantees of the
14th amendment.142 Even in the majority of states which possess such
a clause, Justice Holmes' "continuing jeopardy" argument might
serve as a convenient rationale for establishment of state appeals.14
The question then becomes one of determining whether we should
wait until the long drawn-out move to institute state appeals has
crystallized before abandoning the same evidence test. The answer
should be in the negative. Holmes' reasoning that "at the present time
in this country there is more danger that criminals will escape justice
than that they will be subjected to tyranny," 144 though probably still
justified in a narrow technical sense, is much less self-evident when
viewed against the political background of our times. The rapid change
of the political climate occurring before our very eyes strengthens the
necessity of eliminating any possible misuse of procedural devices for
oppressive purposes. The "different offense"--"same evidence" tech-
nique, as it operates now, might easily become such a device. It de-
prives criminal judgments of their finality and thus makes the double
jeopardy guarantee meaningless. 45 The need for assurance that judg-
ments will stand, once the admissible legal remedies are exhausted,
requires the dropping of the same evidence test. 4 1
Far-fetched statutory changes are not needed to close the loopholes
now threatening the finality of criminal judgments. The problem is
rather one of awareness of the ultimate issues involved. Once the
142. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
143. Kepnerv. United States, 195 U.S. 100,134 (1904) (dissenting opinion).
144. Ibid.
145. A recent report of an Argentina case provides an excellent illustration: a number of
women had been sentenced to 30 days in jail for "unauthorized meeting." Their provisional
release had been ordered by the judge. Instead of releasing them, the police "loaded them
into a patrol wagon and took them to a different court" where "they were sentenced to 30
days for violation of local ordinances against making noise and obstructing traffic," N.Y.
Times, Sept. 13, 1948, p.6 , col. 2.
146. The odyssey of the defendants in Cole v. Arlmnsas, 333 U.S. 196 (194S) illustrates
the runaround which might result from segmented offense charges under the present practice:
an initial indictment had been reversed (210 Ark. 433, 196 S.W. 2d 582 (1946) ) because
use of force and violence to prevent from engaging in lawful vocation had been charged
(Arkansas, Act 193, § 2 (1943)). Instead of (1) threat of violence under the same paragraph
or (2) unlawful assembly at the place of labor dispute with the purpose of using force or
violence to prevent others from engaging in a lawful vocation according to par. 2, a new
information under par.2 was sustained by the Arkansas Supreme Court (211 Ark. 836, 202
S.W. 2d 770 (1947)) under par. I which constitutes a cognate offense; however, it cannot be
considered lex generalis in relation to par. 2 because par. 2 omits the use of threats. The
reversal by the Supreme Court -as probably unavoidable as the Arkansas Supreme Court
did not give the defendants a chance to defend themselves against the modified charge.
However, the result, trial before three jurisdictions with five individual instances, could have
been avoided either by multiplication of counts or by a liberal amendment practice. The
jury could have been left with the problem of which counts it w.anted to use for the acts of
the defendants.
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fictitious character of the grand jury obstacle is generally recognized
and the prohibition of amendments restricted to those cases where a
possible disadvantage to the defendant becomes discernible, no further
impediments to abandonment of the same evidence test seem to exist.
The test is a child of judicial interpretation; courts have gained enough
experience in juggling, interpreting and interchanging act and offense
concepts to be relied on to come forward with good and sufficient rea-
sons justifying its demise.
Hand in hand with the adoption of the transaction test should go
the radical separation of the two distinct issues fused in present double
jeopardy practice: the prohibition of new indictments arising out of
the same fact situation, and the propriety of cumulating counts and
sentences as the result of one and the same trial. The transaction test
should be reserved to shield a defendant against a second prosecution
started de novo. It should not serve as a means for raising, often be-
latedly, by habeas corpus,147 the propriety of a sentence.
But there must be some yardstick by which to gauge the propriety of
cumulative sentences based on different counts of the same indict-
ment. In many cases, substantive analysis of the offenses involved
might provide the answer-thus, cumulation would be eliminated in
all situations which do not satisfy the requirement of norm competi-
tion. 48 Where a true case of norm competition does occur, then the
question of whether terms should run consecutively or concurrently
will remain a matter for the discretion of the sentencing court.
147. Peters, Collateral Attack by Habeas Corpus, 23 WASH. L. REV. 87, 91 (1948) approves
the raising of the double jeopardy issue in habeas corpus proceedings. However, if the cumu-
lation of sentences on plural counts is treated as a problem of the correct application of
substantive law, the issue should be raised on appeal.
148. The principle is applied in: Durrett v. United States, 107 F. 2d438 (5th Cr. 1939);
Holiday v. United States, 44 F.Supp. 747 (N.D. 1942) aff'd, 130 F. 2d 988 (8th Cir. 1942),
cert. denied, 317 U.S. 691 (1943), rehearing denied, ibid. (first count bank robbery by force
and violence, second count bank robbery by use of dangerous weapons with jeopardy of
life-consecutive sentences of 10 years on first and 15 on second count; sentence on first
count vacated).
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